A 1968 review of American strategy under US Commander C. Abrams, by the MACV "Long Range Planning Group" testifies to the efficacy of the PAVN/NLF strategy:[85]. Not only was the enemy elusive, but some American units developed "firebase psychosis" – a reluctance to move and fight too far away from the supporting fires of fixed bases. 1970) pp. One of the sites of the worse atrocity was the city of Hue. Such "revolutionary government" would set and collect taxes, draft soldiers to fight, impress laborers for construction tasks, administer justice, redistribute land, and coordinate local community events and civic improvements. (McLean, Virginia: General Research Corporation, 1978) p. 26, 82, Quoted in: Karen De Young, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell, (Alfred Knofpf: 2006), pp. The VC entered a village and harangued the local populace about supporting the Revolution before digging in, and passing word to the district capital that they were active in the community. Harsh methods to suppress dissent, and abrasive personalities in his administration alienated a number of South Vietnamese, particularly Buddhists. C. Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable U.S. The pacification-first approach. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson Frizell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam, (Crane: New York), p. 120, Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, The General Offensives of 1968–69. [28] All of the more ambitious plans above had their own technical and political difficulties, some historians argue – including the threat of Chinese intervention, a repeat of the guerrilla warfare in the North as the Viet Minh did with the French, or other countermeasures by the North Vietnamese, who, in conjunction with allies such as the Pathet Lao, could have simply widened the war in Cambodia, Laos and even into Thailand as a reaction to American moves elsewhere. American advisers might just begin to see results on the ground when they were rotated out. Class background was important with those from the middle and upper-classes receiving less favorable treatment. Assessment of the VC fighter. [65], Uneven progress of US pacification effort. Others were loosely affiliated supporters or well-wishers. Military structure of the PLAF. Cadres usually downplayed communism, stressing local grievances and resentments, and national independence. Each battalion in turn was subdivided into companies and platoons, with heavy weapons units augmenting the small arms of the line troops. The formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) lies in the communist dominated resistance to the French – the Viet Minh. The Communists would later lament that this redistribution of land "seriously interfered" with their subsequent efforts to win over the peasantry through land reform. [50], Tet was a definite change in strategy for the VC which largely had fought smaller-scale mobile and guerrilla warfare since the US arrival. This fifth-column built on the anti-French resistance of the Vietminh. Other recruits were expected to serve as part-time village helpers or guerrillas. II, p. 116. Those who argue that the United States’ opponents won the war cite the United States’ overall objectives and outcomes. A small nucleus of followers was usually gathered, and these were used to further expand recruitment. 21–44, Robert Osprey, War In the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, (DoubleDay: 1975), Walter J. Boyne. Prominent "southern-firsters" led by Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh maintained that the Diem regime was tottering on the ropes and quick victory could be assured by an aggressive push that required Main Force confrontations with both the South Vietnamese and the Americans. [3], Use of local grievances and individuals. Along with bombs some 400,000 tons of napalm were dropped and some 19.1 million gallons of herbicides were applied. Its military wing was officially called the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) but became more popularly known as the Viet Cong (VC). Communist forces deployed an extensive and sophisticated intelligence apparatus within South Vietnam, extending from the top echelons of the Southern regime, to village level guerrilla helpers informing on ARVN troop movements. Networks of informers were numerous and the system used blackmail, threats and propaganda to secure the cooperation of GVN functionaries, often working through their relatives. [12] Guerrilla warfare for example co-existed alongside conventional operations, and propaganda and terrorism would always be deployed throughout the conflict. Some mines were set only to go off after heavy vehicle passage, causing extensive slaughter aboard packed civilian buses. 247–312. They are incorporated here due to their widespread popular usage by both South Vietnamese and American military personnel and civilians, and common usage in standard histories of the Vietnam War. Resources were better spent securing key rice-producing villages under pressure by VC operatives, or training ARVN forces to be more effective. Douglas Pike, Paper prepared for the Fourteenth Military History Symposium, "Vietnam 1964–1973: An American Dilemma." 1981. This approach not only failed to consistently bring big enemy units to battle, but failed to win the "hearts and minds" of the populace. Cadres were expected to be of exemplary proletarian, moral and political character, faithfully implementing the most recent party line, and monitoring assigned areas for erroneous thought. Look at the answer of others before me, I can see that they pt off to the term VC, and do not care about PC. The NLF- National Liberation Front, a collection of groups, and sympathizers opposed to the Diem government and its successors or sympathizing with the communist cause. [42] Troop rotation policies also hindered continuity in pacification. I am a Vietnam Army veteran. Other excellent arms included the RPG-2 and various recoilless rifles. He was also a high-ranking Party operatives manipulated civilian front groups and sympathizers, as well as military units. Diem's bravery and calm demeanor during these attempts to kill him often won the esteem of American supporters. The communist strategy was to kill as many ARVN effectives as possible, paving the way for a collapse of the South Vietnamese regime before the Americans could arrive in force. They hurt the Viet Cong badly in military terms, and northern-born personnel were to increasingly dominate the Main-Force VC formations. Impressive as they seemed, big American or GVN sweeps inevitably moved on, failing to 'hold' an area and its population. 296 views In the preface, the author freely admits that he ”took the liberty of inventing dialogue for Hathcock’s North Vietnamese and Viet Cong opponents.” He also invents their thoughts, and, I suspect, some of the dialogue and thoughts of the Americans as well. Material requirements were comparatively light, and much was procured inside South Vietnam itself. Murder, kidnapping, torture and general intimidation were a routine part of VC/NVA operations and were calculated to cow the populace, liquidate opponents, erode the morale of GVN government employees, and boost tax collection and propaganda efforts. As in any guerrilla warfare, control of the populace is the key to the guerrilla's prosperity and survival. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-65, 70-82, Taylor Branch, 1998. While aid from the Soviet bloc and China to the North continued unabated, American congressional action cut off the use of US military assets and sharply reduced promised aid to the South. Since Party operatives were in place at all levels throughout the entire structure, coordination and control of the vast politico-military effort was enhanced.[91]. "[10] Ironically, Diem's American backers also failed to provide him with adequate funding to help buy land for redistribution to small peasants. The United States supported the South, while China and Russia supported the North. In the early stages of the Vietnam War, American officials "discovered that several thousand supposedly government-controlled 'fortified hamlets' were in fact controlled by Viet Cong guerrillas, who 'often used them for supply and rest havens'. Diem also placed limits on foreign capitalists and the amount of control they could exercise in various sectors. [18] By 1972, the guerrilla threat had essentially been reduced to low-level proportions and the Southern regime's hand was strengthened. [100] A 1965 Christian Science Monitor article by Japanese journalist Takashi Oka reported on what seemed to be use of the method. [48], Uneven progress of US pacification effort. "- Martin Bormann, Former German Military. Material requirements were comparatively light, and much was procured inside South Vietnam itself. Most of this amount, like that of air-delivered bombs, also fell on the territory of America's ally, South Vietnam. (No. Assessment of the VC fighter. [106], The greatest number of people eliminated however appeared to be during the Viet Cong retreat from the city. Instead, they shifted down to Phase 2 guerrilla and small unit mobile warfare to bleed their opponents, interspersed with occasional large-scale attacks when conditions and numbers were favorable. [76], Attacks on U.S. forces or influencing US elections were not of major importance during Tet. Hit squads attacked and eliminated selected enemies. The Khmer Rouge emerged from the chaos of the Vietnam War to the east; its leadership was allied with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong opponents of American troops. Military structure of the PLAF. [24] Guerrilla warfare for example co-existed alongside conventional operations, and propaganda and terrorism would always be deployed throughout the conflict. During the Second Indochina War, better known as the Vietnam War, a distinctive land warfare strategy and organization was used by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) or better known as the Viet Cong (VC) in the West, and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) or North Vietnamese Army (NVA) to defeat their American and South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) opponents. The US counter-strategy was ineffective in a number of ways against Communist forces. Johnson. level. Cadres had their own chain of command, parallel with that of the military structure. 2002 "Victory in Vietnam. 4th Quarter 2007), pp. 27–118, Benjamin L. Harrison, Hell on a Hill Top: America's Last Major Battle in Vietnam (iUniverse: 2004), pp. [17], The North stiffened the early NLF effort in four ways:[18]. Compared to their NLF counterparts most PAVN had a higher standard of literacy. [3], South Vietnamese propaganda poster urging Viet Cong fighters to surrender, The "parallel government" – strengthening the VC grip on the masses. The American concept of leaving the relatively ineffective ARVN to cope with this key other war, a task they had often failed at in several years prior to US intervention, played into the NLF's hands. More than twice the tonnage of bombs dropped during the entire World War II Pacific War was deposited on the South by the US. During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong acted as the military arm of the National Liberation Front (NLF), a communist-leaning political organization … That was the battle cry of my generation, or rather it was the retreat from battle cry of my generation. A 1968 review of American strategy under US Commander C. Abrams, by the MACV "Long Range Planning Group" testifies to the efficacy of the PAVN/NLF strategy:[68]. Murder, kidnapping, torture and general intimidation were a routine part of VC/NVA operations and were calculated to cow the populace, liquidate opponents, erode the morale of GVN government employees, and boost tax collection and propaganda efforts. [67], Tet was a definite change in strategy for the VC which largely had fought smaller-scale mobile and guerrilla warfare since the US arrival. Those who argue that the United States’ opponents won the war cite the United States’ overall objectives and outcomes. The result was under-strength units up front, and huge wastage and theft of weapons, equipment and supplies in the rear. [3][106] The 2,800 bodies in Hue were part of a larger group of some 5,800 civilians in the city targeted in Viet Cong attacks for liquidation or abduction. LOGIN TO VIEW ANSWER. [41], Some Western historians of the Vietnam War assert that US troops were often used inefficiently. The war however had ceased being primarily a guerrilla conflict and had become conventional, with Hanoi openly bidding for victory during the 1972 Easter attack. This fifth-column built on the anti-French resistance of the Vietminh. Intimidation. The U.S. paid the salaries of the torturers, taught them new methods, and turned suspects over to the police. Members of the combat support unit were also responsible for placing mines and booby traps. Massive US troop sweeps and interdiction efforts while causing substantial pain to communist forces at different times and places, foundered on these realities.[82]. The deeper PAVN formations moved into South Vietnam, the more coordination was needed with NLF/VC and regional forces. During the Second Indochina War, better known as the Vietnam War, a distinctive land warfare strategy and organization was used by the Main Force of the People's Liberation Armed Forces (better known as the Viet Cong or VC in the West) and the NVA (North Vietnamese Army/People's Army-Vietnam) to defeat their American and South Vietnamese (GVN/ARVN) opponents. Farmers who owned "too much" land might also be fingered. As for making an impact in the United States, it had not been our intention – but it turned out to be a fortunate result. Hanoi coordinated its direction through the COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam. Pelican Publishing. Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter Offensive of 1972, Indochina Monograph (Washington, D.C.. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh, Lam Son 719, Indochina Monograph (Washington, D.C., Vo Nguyen Giap, Big Victory, Great Task, (Pall Mall Press, London (1968), Ray Bonds, ed., "The Vietnam War, (Salamander Books: 1979), pp. [84], Another terror method involved deliberate random shelling of populated areas with 122-mm rockets. In my opinion, the enemy, mostly North Vietnamese Army regulars but some percentage of Viet Cong guerrillas, fought hard and fought well. Members of the combat support unit were also responsible for placing mines and booby traps. The attack led to initial gains for the North Vietnamese, with 80,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacking 36 of 44 provincial capitals. Diem's "Denounce Communism" campaign for example, indiscriminately persecuted and alienated numerous civilians (including people who helped the anti-French resistance) who may or may not have had strong links or sympathies with Communism. A creature of the Northern regime, the overall Viet Cong structure was made up of three parts:[79]. [51] Widespread destruction among the civilian population is typical of many guerrilla conflicts—from the ancient Romans in Spain to the colonial wars of Africa[52]—nevertheless such methods led many opponents of the US war to question both their legality and morality, and intensified political and diplomatic pressure against American involvement in the conflict. Whatever the exact front, issue, or cover used, the goal was control and manipulation of the target population. Illiteracy and lack of education was often a problem in VC ranks, and steps were made to correct this, with focus on the political task at hand. Some writers have questioned whether either pacification or "search and destroy" would have made any difference given dwindling American resolve, the big unit focus, other American and South Vietnamese weaknesses noted above, and the Communist strategy of attritional, protracted war. Ironically, officials who were TOO efficient or honest might also be liquidated since their conduct might mitigate the grievances and resentments the cadres sought to stoke. Opposing them during the war's early phases were (on paper by various estimates) over 300,000 ARVN troops and a US troop level that stood at around 16,000 in 1964, This was to increase rapidly in later years.[2]. [2] The term PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam), identifies regular troops of the North Vietnamese Army or NVA as they were commonly known by their Western opponents. Cadres were assigned to each level of the structure, a "parallel" administration that constantly supervised and watched those tasked with the activities of the Revolution. [112], Historical development of the NLF and PAVN, Successes and failures of Diem: main NLF opponent, Death of Diem and expansion of northern takeover campaign, Northern build-up of early southern insurgent forces, Translation of Dau Tranh doctrine into military action, Debates over the gradualist approach and bolder plans, Heavy footprint of US operations on South Vietnam, Pacification versus 'Search and Destroy' against the NLF/PAVN, Strategy disputes and shifts in the Communist high command, "Southern-firsters" versus "Northern-firsters", Tet as a strategic VC political and psychological victory, The "other war:" the population base, tempo and strategy, Drawing US forces to the periphery while shifting between phases, Effectiveness of overall Northern strategy, Dominant role of Northern based Lao Dong (communist) party, Organization of NLF/PAVN units in the field, Morale and discipline: the 3-man cell and "self-criticism", Effectiveness of NLF and PAVN organization, Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, (The MIT Press: new ed. It also widened the battlespace across a broad area, enhancing maneuvering room and survivability. Continued efforts to build the revolutionary VC infrastructure and weaken GVN forces via propaganda and organization. The Viet Cong used this to their advantage to scare, and even kill, American soldiers. NVA training was surprisingly conventional, with little special emphasis on jungle warfare. Trans. These two tracks: popular support, and coercion/intimidation, were to run on together for a good part of the War.[73]. In the words of one US Department of Defence assessment called "Alternate Strategies" in March 1968, after the first phase or Tet: People's War strategy drew the Americans into remote areas, facilitating control of the real prize- the population base. The PLAF was also controlled by COVSN, which took its orders from the North. Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War", Selected Works, Eng. The Viet Cong also used the US’ Napalm as an advantage, as when the US alerted their commanders of a sighting of the Viet Cong forces, the Viet Cong would draw the enemies in to the sighting area leading to the US sometimes accidently killing their own forces. The GVN made measurable progress in securing its population base—retaking areas once dominated by the VC and rooting out their clandestine infrastructure. Sending thousands of northern cadres into the south as leaders and trainers, sometimes aggravating a regional culture clash within revolutionary ranks. High-Technology Regular Force Strategy, As the border battles of 1967 wound down, Hanoi's war directors prepared for a savage blow- the Tong Cong kich, Tong Khoi Nghia or "General Uprising" among the Southern masses, known more popularly to Westerners as the Tet Offensive. Military Affairs Committees were coordinating groups that liaisoned and coordinated activity with the Central Reunification Department, another coordination body for the complex effort. Given the Communist Party's dominance over all spheres of Northern Vietnamese society, including the military struggle, it is impossible to understand VC/NVA organization, strategy and tactics without detailing party involvement. 37–146, Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. While this threat never eventuated, the CPV wanted to neutralise the risks posed by loyalists and other political opponents. At all levels of the structure, the control of the Communist party was constant. The NLF/VC took in not just armed guerrillas but served as a broad front for a variety of groups opposed to Diem. The Viet Cong thrive in an environment of insecurity. [48] Such methods yielded both practical benefits and cynical propaganda opportunities. Service and indoctrination under the communist system prior to army recruitment made the typical NVA fighter a bit older and more seasoned than his American or ARVN opponent. The PLAF was also controlled by COVSN, which took its orders from the North. VC operatives emerged after the destruction to tell survivors about the perfidy of the US imperialists. While segments of the government of South Vietnam suffered severe problems in leadership, motivation and administration, it is clear that millions of ordinary South Vietnamese opposed insurgent and northern efforts to take over South Vietnam. Some groups were deliberately created fronts of the PRP, or were taken over and manipulated. [79], Three tier VC military formation: The VC/PLAF military formations were generally grouped into 3 echelons. [45] Others argue that a fundamental flaw in the American ground strategy was a focus on attrition rather than counterinsurgency to secure the population. COVSN supervised VC forces (Main Force, Regional and Village Guerrilla) in this zone. Diem's coldness towards Buddhist sensibilities in some areas also aggravated an already shaky situation. To accomplish the most difficult task of the war—and, really the functional reason for the US to be here—that of providing security to the Vietnamese people—we have relied on the numerous, but only marginally effective, ill-equipped and indifferently led Vietnamese paramilitary and police units. By 1975, when the final conquest by the NVA/PAVN began, the South Vietnamese were on their own. Which statement best describes the Americans who served in Vietnam? With hundreds of thousands dead, and many localized examples of excellent combat performance, important segments of South Vietnamese society put up a strong fight against Northern hegemony. 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This would enable villagers to contrast their relatively restrained, non-pecuniary way of life with!

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